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I. INTRODUCTION

The prohibition of attacks expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life; injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects that
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated lies at the heart of the rules of international
humanitarian law (IHL) regulating the conduct of hostilities.
According to Article 51(5)(b) of the First Additional Protocol of 1977
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I), a disproportionate attack is
an attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.
Although first codified in Additional Protocol I, the prohibition
was already considered a rule of customary law at the time,' and

* Senior Fellow, Oxford Institute of Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict and Research
Fellow, Individualisation of War Project, European University Institute. The research
leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council
under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC
Grant Agreement No [340956 - IOW].
See, e.g., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 317 (Michael
1.
Bothe, Karl Joseph Partsch & Waldermar A. Solf eds., 2d ed. 2013); INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 ¶¶
1826, 1864 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977] ("In the

Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, like the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949,
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there now appears to be general agreement that it constitutes a rule
of customary law applicable in international and non-international
armed conflicts.2
The rule on proportionality represents the most apparent
manifestation of the balance between military necessity and
considerations of humanity that underpins IHL. As military
operations are taking place in densely populated areas with
increasing frequency, the rule's significance for the protection of
civilians has become even more key. It is of central relevance to the
current discussions on the use of explosive weapons in populated
areas.
Determining what falls into the two "sides" of the proportionality
assessment as clearly as possible is essential to the proper application
of the rule in practice. The expected "military advantage side" of the
equation has received considerable attention; the "incidental harm
side" less so-even though it is equally key in assessing the
lawfulness of an attack. It raises a number of legal issues that need to
be addressed by belligerents to ensure they are complying with the
law. Proportionality is a challenging topic and is frequently
misunderstood by nonexperts and the media, particularly while
hostilities are unfolding. Addressing the incidental harm side of the
assessment would also provide reassurance that this dimension is
being given proper consideration.
This Article focuses on just some of the questions covered at the
IDF panel, although there are many that warrant closer
consideration.

II. APPLYING THE SAME YARDSTICK TO BOTH SIDES OF THE ASSESSMENT

First, as a preliminary point, the same interpretation of what
constitutes an attack must be adopted for both "sides" of the
proportionality assessment. Article 49(1) of AP I defines attacks as
"acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in
defence." 3 There has been considerable discussion of what constitutes
an "attack" for determining the expected military advantage in
the rule of protection is deemed to be generally accepted as a rule of law, though at
that time it was not considered necessary to formulate it word for word in the texts
themselves.").
2.
See, e.g., 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 46
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005); NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra

note 1 (stating that customary international law requires the parties engaged in armed
conflict are "required to distinguish between military targets and civilians and civilian
targets and to direct their military operations only against military objectives").
3.
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convetions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
49(1), June 30, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1].
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proportionality assessments. There is agreement that it is neither, at
one end of the spectrum, one single strike, nor, at the other, a
military campaign as a whole. 4 A number of states submitted

statements at the time of ratification of AP I indicating their
understanding that the military advantage anticipated from an
attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the
attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular
parts thereof.5
the
same
proportionality
assessments,
In
conducting
interpretation of "attack" must also be adopted for assessing the
expected incidental harm. The language of Article 51(5)(b) of AP I
does not suggest otherwise, and taking a different approach would
undermine the very purpose of the rule.
Thus, if in assessing the anticipated military advantage it is the
"attack as a whole rather than isolated or particular parts of the
attack" that must be considered, it is the expected incidental harm
from the same attack "as a whole" that must be put on the other side
of the scales. This means that it is the immediate incidental harm
caused by different elements of the "attack" that must be considered,
and that the same timeframe must be adopted for considering
relevant harm as for the military advantage.
By way of example, in the 2006 discussions on explosive
remnants of war, it was noted that the use of cluster munitions could
lead to a military advantage that materialised in the longer term.
Unexploded submunitions could prevent enemy combatants from
accessing particular areas in the mid-to-long term. The same
timeframe must be the basis for assessing expected civilian harm.6

4.
See PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT
HARVARD UNIV., MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE
WARFARE 11-13 (2013).
See, e.g., UK Reservation upon Ratification, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
5.

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsflNotification.xsp?action=Open
CROSS,
Document&documentId=OA9EO3FOF2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2 (last visited Feb.
(archived Feb. 18, 2018). Similar
21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/WW9H-3XQS]
declarations were also made by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, New Zealand and Spain. Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional
Protocols, and their Commentaries, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,

https://ihl-

databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsflStates.xsp?xp-viewStates=XPagesNORMStatesPa
rties&xp-treatySelected=470 (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Q5KVCQRZ] (archived Feb. 13, 2018).
Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on
6.
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Expected
Civilian Damage and the ProportionalityEquation-To What Extent Should the Mid to
Longer Term Consequences of Explosive Remnants of War Be Taken into Consideration

in the ProportionalityAssessment, TT 31-33, U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.III/WP.9 (Nov. 15,
2006) [hereinafter Third Review Conference].
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III. THE TYPES OF HARM OR DAMAGE THAT FALL WITHIN THE
PROPORTIONALITY ASSESSMENT

The second set of comments relates to the types of incidental
harm to be considered in proportionality assessments. The
formulation of proportionality in Additional Protocol I mentions three
types of harm or damage: loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and
damage to civilian objects.
First, when considering the death or injury to civilians, whose
civilians should be considered? Usually it is the civilians under the
control of the enemy who are considered, on the assumption that a
state would not conduct attacks that could put "its" civilians at risk.
However, the way hostilities have recently been conducted in a
number of contexts, including most notably the use of human shields
and the intentional placement of military objectives in civilian
infrastructure, indicates this is not necessarily the case.
The majority of the rules of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC V) 7
only apply to "protected persons" within the meaning of the
Convention: persons who find themselves, in case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying power
of which they are not nationals. 8 In contrast, the rules on the conduct
of hostilities codified in Additional Protocol I-including the
prohibition on attacking civilians and the prohibition on
disproportionate attacks-extend to all civilians, not just those in the
hands of a party of which they are not nationals.9
Consequently, it appears uncontroversial that it is the expected
harm to all civilians-those under the effective control of the enemy
and those under the effective control of the attacker, including its
own nationals-that must be considered in a proportionality
assessment. 10

7.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War arts. 13-26, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV].
8.
Id. art. 4.
9.
As pointed out in the ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, "[i]n
protecting civilians against the dangers of war, the important aspect is not so much
their nationality as the inoffensive character of the persons to be spared."
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977, supra note 1, ¶ 1909.
10.
See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF

INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 120 (2016) (noting that it is the duty of all parties to
remove civilians under their control from the vicinity of military objectives); IAN
HENDERSON,

THE CONTEMPORARY

LAW

OF TARGETING

227-29

(2009)

("[A] very

important point is that nationality of the civilians is an irrelevant consideration. A
State's own civilians are immune from consequences of an attack just as much as are
the enemy's civilans.")
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This was the position recently adopted by the Syria Commission
of Inquiry, which, in assessing whether a government airstrike that
damaged a water spring was disproportionate, considered its adverse
impact on civilians in opposition and government-held territory.' 1
Second, attacks against military objectives frequently have
numerous serious adverse consequences on civilians in addition to
death, injury, and damage to property. This is particularly the case
for attacks conducted in populated areas. The damage and
destruction caused by the attacks, as well as the risks posed by
unexploded remnants of war, frequently lead to displacement, impede
access by humanitarian organisations to people in need, prevent
children from attending school, impair livelihood activities, and delay
post-conflict reconstruction.12
Belligerents should take these consequences into account as part
of their obligation to spare the civilian population.' 3 While some of
this harm is not specifically mentioned in the formulation of
proportionality in Additional Protocol I, consideration could be given
to it by granting extra "weight" to the damage to certain objects. By
way of example, Article 51(5)(b) of AP I does not mention
displacement of civilians among the types of expected incidental harm
to be considered. However, the fact that displacement is likely to
occur as a result of an attack expected to destroy civilian homes could
affect the weight to be given to that destruction in the proportionality
calculation. Greater weight should be given to their destruction than
to that of deserted homes or business premises.14

IV. "REVERBERATING" OR "KNOCK-ON" EFFECTS

The final point to touch upon is whether incidental harm arising
from what are often referred to as the "reverberating" or "knock-on"
effects of an attack should be included in proportionality assessments.
This type of incidental harm can occur in a number of different
ways. These include, first, situations where the harm does not occur
immediately; like when a civilian is injured by unexploded cluster

U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Investigation by the Office of the
11.
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: Detailed Findings, TT
32-37, U.N. Doc A/HRC/34/CRP.3 (Mar. 10, 2017).
See, e.g., SIMON BAGSHAW, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
12.
HUMANITARIAN AFF., COMPILATION OF MILITARY POLICY AND PRACTICE: REDUCING THE
HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN POPULATED AREAS 9-11

(2017),
https://www.unocha.org/sites/unochalfiles/OCHA%2OCompilation%20of%/`
[https://perma.cc/5HDE-CLRR]
20Military%2OPolicy%20and%20Practice%202017.pdf
(archived Feb. 13, 2018).
Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 57(1).
13.
14.
See Laurent Gisel, Relevant Incidental Harm for the Proportionality
Principle, 46 COLLEGIUM 118, 120 (2015).
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submunitions months after they were employed in an attack. This
could be referred to as "delayed effect." Second is harm that, even
though it occurs immediately after an attack, continues for a
prolonged period of time, as is the case, for example, with diseases
caused by the use of "toxic" weapons. This could be referred to as
"long term harm." Third is harm that is not caused by the attack
itself but occurs because of damage to another object that, in turn,
leads to incidental harm. An example could be death and disease
resulting from damage to civilian objects that provide vital services to
the civilian population, such as hospitals. These are referred to as
"knock-on effects." A more elaborate version occurs when an attack
damages one object and, as a consequence of this, a different civilian
object cannot function, leading to civilian casualties. An example
would be an attack that damages the electricity-generating and
distribution systems, which means that the water purification
systems cannot operate, leading to an outbreak of waterborne
diseases. Essentially, there appear to be two principal forms of this
type incidental harm: harm that does not manifest itself immediately
upon the attack and harm that occurs as a result of a knock-on effect.
IHL treaties provide limited guidance on whether, and if so, to
what extent, this type of damage should be included in
proportionality assessments. Article 51(5)(b) of AP I refers to
"anticipated" military advantage and "expected" incidental harm.1 5 It
is probably safe to assume that for present purposes the terms
"anticipated" and "expected" are synonymous. These are understood
as meaning that it is only incidental harm that is foreseeable that
should be taken into account.
However, while there are adjectives that set parameters for the
military advantage side of the equation-"concrete and direct"-there
are none for the incidental harm side. Does this mean that all
incidental harm that is reasonably foreseeable must be factored into a
proportionality assessment? Or is there a point when harm, even
though foreseeable, is too remote? There appears to be no basis for
claiming that remoteness in space or over time should automatically
put incidental harm outside the scope of a proportionality
assessment. More relevant is the fact that with the passage of time or
with a longer "chain of causation" the possibility for intervening acts
to occur is greater, which makes it more difficult to foresee the
occurrence of the harm.
This appears to be the concern underlying some experts'
reservations. For example, in relation to the question of whether the
possible harm from unexploded cluster submunitions should be taken
into account in proportionality assessments, it was noted that this

15.

Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b).
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risk would be affected by a number of factors, including when
civilians are likely to be allowed to return; which steps parties in
control of the area are likely to take to mark or clear contaminated
16
areas; and whether civilians are likely to heed prohibitions. While it
is true that these variables will affect the foreseeability of the harm,
this does not mean the harm should be excluded.
Other areas of public international law may offer guidance on
this aspect of proportionality assessment. For example, remoteness is
mentioned in the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, but for
a different purpose: determining the extent of the obligation to make
full reparation for injury caused by an internationally wrongful act. It
is nonetheless interesting to see that even in that context the ILC
excluded "damage which is too indirect, remote or uncertain to be
appraised."' 7 The ILC then noted that:
causality in fact is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for reparation.
There is a further element, associated with the exclusion of injury that is too
'remote' or 'consequential' to be the subject of reparation. In some cases, the
criterion of 'directness' may be used, in others 'foreseeability' or 'proximity'. But
other factors may also be relevant: for example, whether State organs
deliberately caused the harm in question, or whether the harm caused was
within the ambit of the rule which was breached, having regard to the purpose
of that rule. In other words, the requirement of a causal link is not necessarily

the same in relation to every breach of an international obligation.

18

Consideration should also be given to whether particular areas of
domestic law, such as torts, could provide guidance on this question.
When drawing analogies, it should be borne in mind that the policy
considerations underlying the prohibition on disproportionate attacks
in IHL-balancing the expected military advantage of an attack with
expected incidental harm-may be very different from those
underlying domestic rules on liability for torts or breaches of contract.

V. NEXT STEPS

In recognition of the centrality of the prohibition of
disproportionate attacks to the rules regulating conduct of hostilities
in modern warfare, it is the topic of a number of expert
consultations-some recently concluded and others still ongoing,
including the work of the International Law Association on the

16.
Third Review Conference, supra note 6, ¶ 19.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
17.
A/56/10, at 227 (2001).
Id. at 227-28.
18.
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conduct of hostilities; 19 an expert workshop convened by the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the Universit6 de
Laval in June 2016; and a Harvard Programme on International Law
and Armed Conflict project. 20
The panel on proportionality at the IDF Conference was the
genesis of a Chatham House project that aims to contribute to the
debate by continuing the reflection on the incidental harm side of
proportionality assessments. 21 Beginning in the autumn of 2017,
Chatham House will convene a number of expert consultations to
inform the elaboration of a report analyzing the constituent elements
of incidental harm and their interplay with the expected military
advantage side of the assessment. To the extent possible, the report
will also identify parameters to provide guidance in applying the rule.
While the focus of the project is the law, careful consideration will
also be given to the practicalities of applying different aspects of the
rule in practice. The report aims to provide guidance to those
conducting military operations, and to the wide range of stakeholders
that play a role in promoting compliance with IHL, including
government officials, legal practitioners, humanitarian organizations,
advocacy groups, and the media.

19.
Int'l Law Assoc. Study Grp. on the Conduct of Hostilities in the 21st
Century, The Conduct of Hostilities and InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Challenges
of 21st Century Warfare, 93 INT'L L. STUD. 322 (2017).
20.
The Programme on International Law and Armed Conflict's (PILAC)
project focuses on what commanders should know before launching an attack against a
military objective. Commanding Knowledge: The Line of Fire in the IHL Principle of
Proportionality, HARV. LAW SCH. PILAC, https://pilac.law.harvard.edulcommandingknowledge-the-line-of-fire-in-the-ihl-principle-of-proportionality
(last visited Feb. 21,
2018) [https://perma.ccJ8SK-BQAM] (archived Feb. 13, 2018).
21.

The

Limits

on

War

and

Preserving Peace,

CHATHAM

HOUSE,

https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/structure/international-law-programmelimitson-war-and-preserving-peace-project (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
2BQQ-JX2X] (archived Feb. 13, 2018).

